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THE LAWYER AND THE PRESERVATION
OF SOCIETY
STEPHEN

J. RUEVE, S.J., M.A., M.S., PH.D.

The cohesiveness of society depends upon its laws, and hence
it is that men skilled in the law exercise an important function in maintaining this cohesiveness through the proper application of just laws.
For man is destined by God, his Creator and Designer, to live in
society and to co-operate with his fellowmen in the realization of the
welfare of all the individuals, which in turn is to be brought about
through the realization of the common good. But human nature, as
we find it, does not co-operate spontaneously and smoothly. True it
is, that all normal minds understands the indispensability of cooperation, but the selfish impulses of vast numbers prompt them to
seek their own advantage exclusively, leaving the socially necessary cooperation to others whom they consider less astute.
This deplorable fact was the inspiration for the term, "chiseler"
popularized in the phrase-making era of the early New Deal. This
lack of co-operation serves too as one of the foundation-stones of
the Leviathan, published in 1651 by Thomas Hobbes. Now, the ultimate purpose of this work was to denounce the political execution
of autocratic Charles I of England in 1649; but its immediate intent
was to construct a rational prop for the institution of monarchical
absolutism, under which the co-operation of all subjects would be
compelled by the irresistible power of the state, concretized in the
royal personage. Hobbes was an interesting, crotchety, and pugnacious old royalist, whose originality and mental acumen have been
much overrated by posterity and especially by himself. His bigotry
and self-assurance led him into many an error; but even he did not
succeed in being a hundred percent wrong, and there was just enough
factualness in his superficial observations to win him an undying place
in English literature for his analysis of the origin and nature of the
state. He pictured a pre-societal man living in a miserable condition
of "war of all against all," in which unbridled liberty nullified personal
security, in which man finally through experience came to realize that,
in order to live, he must organize - setting up a state powerful enough
to coerce any member or group within it who would oppose it. And
so, despite his fundamentally false materialism and superficial observation, he is correct in his contention that man's rights, and hence
man's welfare, cannot prevail unless man lives in organized society
operating through laws and equipped with the might to apply force
when need arises.
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force is not the essence of

human government, nor is the arbitrary decree of any dictator however powerful, even though he be elected by popular acclaim. For,
standing forth as the first great and immovable landmark, is human
nature - human nature as individualized in John and Joe and George
and the billions of others, each of whom has an indefeasible intrinsic
worth, each of whom is basically the equal of everyone else, each of
whom, therefore, is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable
rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Not a modern theory is this, but of ancient lineage, acknowledged
and put into practice with varying degrees of imperfection during the
long course of human existence. Listen, for example, to Pope St.
Gregory the Great in the 6th century writing to the usurping Emperor
Phocas at Constantinople:
"Let each one have his freedom re-acknowledged under the
yoke of considerate rule. For this is the difference between the
kings of barbarians and the emperors of the Roman Commonwealth: the kings of barbarians are the lords over slaves, while
the emperors of the Commonwealth are rulers over free men".1
This human dignity, this human worth and inviolability, finds
widespread and clamorous lip-service. It is the catch-phrase of every
rabble-rousing demagogue, it is the clarion call to arms for true patriots, it is the standard of those who serve mankind, the mask of
the self-seeking, and the funeral-pyre of heroes. No prospective dictator dares to submerge it to any other aim, and not until he has
consolidated his tyranny does he venture to proclaim that individual
worth is subordinate to state, race, or class respectively as he is Fascist,
Nazi, or Communist. But so thoroughly is the appreciation of human
worth interwoven with everyone's thought, so evident to man's mind
that - even with tyrannical power well established - dictators inadvertently lapse into eulogies of the dignity of the individual.
Nevertheless, however loud and widespread the acclaim may be
of human worth and dignity, it is losing its strength. In defense against
the pragmatic ruthlessness of dictators, the defenders of human rights
are playing wishfully with cardboard artillery, trying to create an impressive sound with pop-guns and rattles from the nursery. For
they are skeptical about the truth of their own cause. Some inconsistently trust to the righteousness of the cause, which they consider
devoid of factual foundation; others stubbornly continue the fight in
the pragmatic determination that as long as they have the physical
force they might just as well use it. Few of the defenders of human
rights and dignity find the foundation where alone it can be found,
namely in the divine law.
1 Epistolarium lib.

XIII, Indict. VI, Epist. XXXI.
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For the vast majority have succumbed to the sophistries of secularism: with Hobbes they find the essence of civil authority in irresistible
physical force; with Hegel they see in the state an absolute which
creates right and can do no wrong; with the current of present-day
American legal philosophers they smile condescendingly upon the signers of the Declaration of Independence who naively wrote of unalienable rights conferred upon man by an extra-mundane Creator. The
substance has gone out of the defense of human rights and dignity
just as secularism has stolen in; our legal philosophy is not one whit
better than that of the Fascists or Communists or Nazis, though for
a few years to come our legislation and practice will be better than
theirs; the present belaboring of the Communists is based on the fact
that we do not like their modus operandi, and not on the fact that
they aim to deprive human beings of rights bestowed by God. Much
could be said about the connection between this degenerate condition
of American legal philosophy and the confusion that faces the governmental bodies inquiring into un-American activities of federal officials.
We professedly assume that totalitarianism is un-American, and yet
the logical conclusion of the present-day doctrine that all rights are
concessions of the state, is that the state may deprive the citizens of
all rights whatsoever. (Constitutional guarantees can be rendered ineffectual by judicial interpretation or removed by amendment.)
In accounting for the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, even such
a penetrating writer as Walter Lippman could not quite bring himself
to proclaim that they come ultimately from God. For, what he says
is true enough, but he must stop short by attributing them to the rationality of the soul and the inviolability of the human person, leaving
his readers to wonder who guarantees this inviolability. In his column
in the New York Herald Tribune several years ago, we read :-2
"No one can explain the Bill of Rights to some one who
does not believe that the soul is rational and, that therefore the
human person is inviolable. If he has not grasped this truth, if
he has not had this revelation, if he does not know the idea
which these words express, how will you convince him that his
religion shall not be prescribed by public officials, or that he
has the right to speak, and to listen, or that the powers not
delegated to the government are reserved to the people? How
will you affirm that freedom is better than tyranny if you are
not able to affirm that it is the destiny of man's nature that he
should be free? No one can prove the value of liberty by drawing up a balance sheet of profits and losses. If men do notunderstand that the origin of their liberties is in the nature of
man, they will not really understand their liberties, nor learn
to value their liberties until they have let them be destroyed.
And so, though they live in freedom, they will squander their
2

Herald Tribune, Dec. 14, 1939.
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inheritance, having forgotten how it was earned and accumulated."
It is not human nature, however, existing in a vacuum, or human
nature serving as its own support, which is the foundation of human
rights. Human nature serves but to indicate for us the will of its
Creator, just as the handiwork of any intelligent designer indicates
the designer's intent and purpose. Now, applying our reason to the
study of human nature, we discover from man's capacities and inclinations and needs that it is God's will that man be free and autocentric, that he be not used as the mere means in the interests of
others, whether of individuals or groups, that his dignity and inviolability be respected by all his fellowmen - in a word, we discover
that in the divine plan he is basically equal to everyone else, and hence
cannot be subjected to another except by his own consent or by
divine disposition. Even the laws enacted for his guidance, whether
secular or ecclesiastical, whether by the majority of the members of
society for the governance of themselves and of the minority, or by
rulers chosen by himself or appointed by divine will - even these
laws must regard as sacred the intrinsic dignity of human nature. For
even before human laws - constitutional or statutory - are enacted,
there is a fixed pattern or standard to which they must conform.
As St. Isidore of Seville wrote in the 7th century Visigothic Kingdom
in Spain:
"A morally upright law will be just, possible, according to
nature, according to the usage of the country, suitable to place
and time, necessary, useful, clear also lest its obscurity be conducive to fraud, and not written for any private interest but
for the common advantage of the citizens". 3
And the reason why the laws must meet this standard? Because
God has shown by the kind of nature He has given man that this
is His will, that He guarantees the rights which serve as the rampart
of defense for human dignity, and that He will require an account
of all who presume to trespass upon it.
Every lawyer is a member of a noble profession: he has been
co-opted -into a group of men who, as a group, engage to preserve
and to perfect an institution established by God Himself, namely
human society, and to apply to this end the means that He has prescribed, namely the preservation of human dignity through the defense of the citizen's rights.
How conscientiously they fulfill the commission given them on
their admission to the bar, will depend entirely upon themselves.
Temptations are not lacking, beckoning them on to reap profit at
3Etymologarum lib. II, cap. x, 6.
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the cost of violating their oath of office by which they solemnly call
upon God to witness that they will work to secure equal justice to all.
Opportunities are not lacking in which by the use of trickery, deceit,
perjury even, they can violate the rights of their fellow-citizens,
clients or opponents, and thus negate the inviolability bestowed upon
all men by God. Physicians, clergymen, businessmen, instructors,
laborers, capitalists, all are charged with the responsibility of maintaining the rights of others, of individuals and of society; but whether
they do so or not, here on earth rests ultimately on the legal profession as a whole functioning as legislators, judges, counselors, administrators. Whether on the one hand we live in orderly society,
or whether on the other we live amid the brutality of anarchic chaos,
depends upon the ability and especially upon the faithfulness with
which the legal profession en masse performs its functions.
And in determining the standard of his professional conduct, a
lawyer ought to be too intelligent to employ the stupid dichotomy by
which personal and professional morality are set apart. This subterfuge really deceives nobody, not even those who seek to bemuse
themselves by it. There is only one standard of morality prescribed
by the divine law, and only one court in which we are finally tried.
In this court there is no place for demurrers, or motions to quash,
or motions for a change of venue, or for dilatory pleas. Everybody
even lawyers - will have to appear for trial before an omniscient
Judge who needs neither witnesses nor jury; who can be neither
coerced by force nor deceived by fraud nor intimidated by threat;
to whom it is of no account whether professional malfeasance was
shrewd enough to escape professional disbarment; whose standard
of morality does not shift with the ebb and flow of the paganism
in our civilization. The sole and fixed standard according to which
judgment will be passed, is the same divine law applicable to menial
and professional man alike, which prescribes our co-operation with
the divine will.
In this connection it may be profitable to note, just in passing, a
recent distillation of arrant nonsense contained in one sentence. It
is nothing new, it derives no importance from the prominence of its
author, and it may have been blurted out in an unthinking moment
of annoyance; but it is common enough, and it does show how entirely
a person can fail to grasp the most fundamental fact of life. In the
issue of Time for June 16th of this year, a report is made on the
attitudes of student veterans interviewed on thirty-eight campuses.
Of course there is considerable variety of attitudes, ranging through
hope, fear, disgust, bewilderment, disillusionment, and fine courage.
One of the students - who is certainly by no means typical of student
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veterans - complains that "teachers are trying to impose morality on
a situation that demands immorality for success." To expatiate on
the futility and nonsense and utter lack of fundamental orientation
displayed in that one sentence would take up too much space and so
it had better be left to the reader's individual reflection. This modem
Jeremias laments, in effect, that his instructors are teaching the need
of morality, whereas the present situation demands that in order to
succeed, a person defy God and thus predetermine himself to complete failure.
Although the individual lawyer is a very small fraction of the two
billion people on earth, his influence is much greater than what the
abstract arithmetic indicates. As a result of his forty or fifty years
of legal activity, the status of social life in his community will have
been considerably impressed by him. For he is practically certain to
occupy positions of importance, whether as simple attorney, or as
legislator, or member of boards and commissions, or as judge. Even
if he engages in ordinary practice, he will be consulted by human
beings who need assistance - people whose rights are jeopardized
through their own folly and ignorance, or through the ill-will of
others, or through the inescapable vicissitudes of life. His skill and
character, his interest in the public good, will often profoundly affect
their lives. For, while he must take the law as he finds it, there is
often a marginal area of undefined procedure in which he can operate
to heal, instead of aggravating, the sores of the social body. And if
he serves in more public and offiical capacities, he can apply his influence toward directing society's policy and practice in sane and just
channels; and in many unexplored details that are not clearly marked
out in black and white, his zeal for the public good and his sound
philosophical principles (if he has them) should prompt him to
choose in accordance with the divine law.
And so it is that the people as a whole look to the legal fraternity
to contribute a mighty share to the welfare of society. Not all the
ills of society are attributable to the malfeasance of our learned custodians of the law; and not all the ills can be cured by even perfect
performance on the part of every member of the legal profession.
But a great share of the task rests upon this noble and influential
profession. From it the people hope that its members' professional
conduct and individual lives will contribute mightily toward the rehabilitation of the law and of the courts in the public esteem; from
it the people demand that, in accordance with the divine law, each
of its members will contril~ute according to his status towards making
society the institution it is designed in the divine plan to be - an
effective instrument for the good of man.

